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In this study, I examine the effects of consumer packaged food manufacturers’ 
voluntary adoption of the Front-of-Package (FOP) nutrition labeling program on firm 
innovation. Specifically, I study if voluntary participation in the program spurs food 
manufacturers to be more innovative and introduce more and better new food products.  
To empirically investigate my research question, I assemble a unique data set 
compiled from several sources of secondary data on consumer packaged food products 
that are introduced in the United States. More specifically, I collected product-specific 
calorie and nutrient information on all the new products that were introduced by food 
manufacturers over a 10-year period during which I analyzed several brands and 
products (more than 600 brands and 7,500 products) in four different food product 
categories. To disentangle the self-selection effect from the causal effect of voluntary 
participation in the program on firms’ innovativeness, I employ a quasi-experimental 
study design using a combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and a series of 
difference-in-differences (DID) and quantile difference-in-differences (QDID) models.  
I focus on two dimensions of innovativeness, quantity and quality of innovation. 
For quantity of innovation, I look at the number of new product introductions and for 
quality of innovation, I assess changes in calorie content, levels of individual nutrients 
and overall nutrition score of new products. The results indicate that firms’ participation 
in FOP nutrition labeling initiative increases their innovativeness on both the quantity 




nutritionally better products as compared to non-participant firms. Additional analyses 
suggest that early adopters of FOP nutrition labeling introduce more new products as 
compared to late adopters of FOP. I also find that the effect of FOP nutrition labeling is 
enhanced for products that carry nutrient content claims. The results of my study have 
important implications for consumers, managers and policymakers, and I hope that this 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Firms often participate in industry-led voluntary initiatives whereby they disclose 
the quality of their products to signal their socially responsible management practices. 
Such examples are replete across many industries. For example, in the context of the 
appliance industry, firms participate in the voluntary Energy Star program created by the 
U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency that 
identifies and promotes energy efficient products. Manufacturing companies voluntarily 
adopt the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard, a voluntary program 
to signal their commitment towards improving their environmental performance. In the 
packaged food industry, food manufacturers participate in the Front-of-Package (FOP) 
nutrition labeling initiative, whereby manufacturers display information on calories and 
key nutrients on the front of the package of their food products to help consumers make 
healthier choices. Even in the case of participation in mandatory programs, firms 
voluntarily adopt practices and standards ahead of the date of mandatory requirement to 
signal their reputation. For example, many firms voluntarily adopted the International 
Financial Reporting Standards prior to the cutoff period by which firms were required to 
be in compliance with the practice. Firms adopt or participate in voluntary programs to 
reduce information asymmetry in the market and to signal their brand quality or 
reputation and in turn influence the purchase behavior of their customers. The purpose of 




programs. I focus on packaged food manufacturers’ adoption of FOP nutrition labeling 
system and examine if firms’ participation in the initiative spurs them to introduce more 
and nutritionally better new products. 
FOP nutrition labeling system is a voluntary initiative whereby food 
manufacturers display information on calories and a set of nutrients in the form of easy-
to-read icons on the front of packaged foods.1 This information about nutrients is in 
addition to the mandatory Nutrition Facts label that is presented on the back or the side 
of packaging. My decision to focus on (packaged) food manufacturers’ adoption of FOP 
nutrition labeling is driven by the following contextual/public policy and empirical 
considerations. From the public policy perspective, due to concerns about obesity and 
diet related diseases, the benefits of providing nutritional information is getting a lot of 
attention among policymakers around the world. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention estimates, more than one-third of American adults are obese. 
Childhood and adolescent obesity has also skyrocketed in the last thirty years with more 
than one third of children and adolescents being overweight or obese in 2012.2 
Government agencies, both at the federal and the state level, have taken several steps to 
address the issue. For example, in 2004, California passed a state-level regulation that 
banned soft drinks from schools (Korry 2003). The packaged food industry, on its part, 
has also voluntarily taken steps to inform consumers about the nutritional value of food 
products so that consumers can make better choices; one such initiative undertaken by 
                                                 





food manufacturers is the FOP nutrition labeling initiative. While a number of extant 
studies in economics and marketing have focused on the demand side effects of 
providing calorie and nutrition related information to consumers (Andrews et al. 2011; 
Van Herpen and Van Trijp 2011; Hawley et al. 2013; Roberto et al. 2012; Sacks et al. 
2009; Van Kleef et al. 2008; Draper et al. 2011), I focus on the firm side consequences. 
More specifically, I focus on the causal relationship between food manufacturers’ 
willingness to disclose product related information and their subsequent innovation. 
From a public policy perspective, this will help understand whether the industry-led 
initiative is just a marketing gimmick or whether it encourages food manufacturers to 
introduce more and better (nutritionally) new products.  
From an empirical perspective, unlike the Nutrition Facts label that is mandatory, 
the adoption of FOP nutrition labeling (henceforth, I simply refer to the initiative as 
“FOP”) is voluntary and therefore requires more scrutiny. On one hand, adoption of FOP 
allows manufacturers to differentiate themselves from competitors and highlight the key 
beneficial nutrients in an easy-to-read format. In addition, unlike Nutrition Facts labels 
which are at the back or the side of the food package, FOP nutrition labels offer greater 
visibility and readability and can help consumers make informed choices (Golan et al. 
2009). On the other hand, there is also some skepticism that adoption of FOP is merely a 
“marketing gimmick” that may not necessarily lead to nutritionally better products for 
consumers and therefore can be misleading (Glanz et al. 2012; Hawley et al. 2013). 
Thus, even if manufacturers introduce new products after FOP adoption, it is critical to 




of nutrition. Accordingly, my study attempts to uncover if FOP adoption leads to 
improvement in the quality of new products in terms of introducing products that are 
high in beneficial nutrients and low in nutrients that consumers seek to avoid. 
Against the above background, I position my study as the first to undertake a 
systematic examination of the effect of food manufacturers’ voluntary adoption of FOP 
on their subsequent innovation in terms of both the quantity and the quality of new 
products. To meet my research objectives, I collected product-specific calorie and 
nutrient information on all the new products that were introduced by food manufacturers 
over a 10-year period (more specifically from January 2003 to May 2013) during which 
I analyzed several brands and products (more than 600 brands and 7,500 products) in 
four different food product categories. The relationship between FOP adoption and firm 
innovativeness, if any, could be due to two different reasons: a) self-selection effect, 
whereby firms with ex-ante inherently better organizational capabilities (unobserved to 
researchers) may self-select into participating in FOP and b) causal effect of FOP 
participation, whereby firms that participate in FOP innovate more subsequent to their 
participation. Disentangling the self-selection effect from the causal effect of FOP 
adoption on subsequent innovativeness is important from both the econometric 
interpretation and the public policy perspectives (more details on this will be discussed 
in the following sections).  
To rule out the endogeneity issue (due to the “self-selection effect”) and establish 
the casual link between FOP adoption and subsequent innovativeness (the “treatment 




experimental approach and create matched sets of adopters and non-adopters (through 
propensity score matching technique). I then estimate a series of brand specific and 
product-specific difference-in-differences (DID) models to quantify the impact of FOP 
adoption on innovation. I focus on two dimensions of innovativeness, quantity or rate of 
new product introductions and (nutritional) quality of new products. While I analyze the 
rate of new product introductions at the brand level, I recognize that food brands may 
have different products nutritionally (e.g., Kellogg’s Raisin Bran vs. Kellogg’s Frosted 
Flakes) and firms may decide to change the nutrition level of these products differently, 
and thus I analyze the quality of innovation at the individual product level. Furthermore, 
I realize that the effect of FOP could vary across the distribution of the level of nutrients. 
For example, it might be easier for firms with poor quality products to improve the 
nutritional content of their products when compared to firms that have nutritionally 
better products to begin with. To capture the heterogeneous effect of FOP adoption 
across the distribution of the level of nutrient content, I employ a series of quantile 
difference-in-differences (QDID) models.  
I would like to acknowledge the following caveat before I present the overview 
of the results of my study. While the interpretation of the results from the rate of new 
product introduction models is fairly straightforward, the interpretation of the results 
from the quality of new product models is not. In my study, I seek to examine if brands 
that adopt FOP produce nutritionally “better” products, with “better” referring to having 
lower calories, higher level of beneficial nutrients that consumers seek to increase in 




(e.g., sugar, fat). To the extent that firms may increase the levels of beneficial nutrients, 
but may also increase the level of nutrients that consumers seek to avoid, I analyze the 
levels of each of the nutrients individually and also overall nutrition. However, I 
acknowledge that firms can increase beneficial nutrients in ways that may not be healthy 
and reduce levels of limiting nutrients in a non-healthy manner (for example, reduction 
in sugar content by the inclusion of artificial sweeteners is not healthy). Given that 
nutritional quality is a multi-dimensional measure, I do not mean to imply that 
nutritionally better products are necessarily healthy. By better quality products, I simply 
refer to products that have lower calories and lower (higher) levels of nutrients that 
consumers seek to avoid (consume). 
The results suggest that firms that adopt FOP introduce more new products 
subsequent to FOP adoption as compared to firms that do not adopt FOP. I find that FOP 
adopter firms introduce overall nutritionally better products subsequent to their adoption 
as compared to firms that do not adopt FOP. However, I find that the improvement in 
nutritional quality varies across the nutrient type, the level of nutrient content and the 
product category. I also find that among the firms that adopt FOP, early adopters of the 
voluntary initiative introduce more new products as compared to late adopters. I also 
find some evidence that among the products of firms that adopt FOP, those products that 
have nutrient content claims such as “Low Fat” or “Rich in Fiber” on their products 
improve the nutritional quality more than products that do not have such claims. 
Interestingly, I find that among the products of firms that adopt FOP, those products that 




innovative in terms of quality of products, when compared to products that do not have 
such claims. 
My study makes the following contributions. From a theoretical perspective, my 
study establishes that firms’ voluntary participation in initiatives that disclose product 
quality is not simply a signaling mechanism (driven solely by the self-selection effect) 
but one by which firms commit to producing more and better products, subsequent to 
their participation. Organizational scholars have long been interested in factors that 
determine the innovativeness of firms. To the best of my knowledge, this study is one of 
the first to demonstrate that the relationship between voluntary participation and firm 
innovativeness which is not just due to the simple self-selection effect but because of the 
causal effect of firms’ participation in socially responsible voluntary programs. The 
finding that early adopters and those who have structural capabilities to produce more 
and nutritionally better products respectively highlights the role of organizational 
capabilities of firms that make such participation more credible and effective.  
With respect to food nutrition labeling programs, whereas most extant studies focus on 
the consumer side, my study is one of the few that looks at the firm side consequences of 
nutrition related policy changes. Given that the mandatory Nutrition Facts label has not 
been effective in changing consumer choice behavior (Kiesel et al. 2011), the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) has increasingly focused on voluntary initiatives by 
food manufacturers to highlight key nutrients on the front of the food packages to serve 




the quality of the products being produced.3 However, at the same time, the FDA has 
sought to avoid the negative consequences associated with the voluntary FOP program 
such as food manufacturers’ misrepresenting information or providing misleading 
information to consumers. The results suggest that voluntary participation in nutrition 
labeling initiatives serves as a catalyst for food manufacturers to produce more new 
products and products that are nutritionally better. Thus, from a public policy 
perspective, I hope that the results of my study would assuage consumer groups’ and 
policymaker’s concern that voluntary adoption of various nutrition related programs is 
merely a marketing gimmick. 
  
                                                 





CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
 
BACKGROUND 
Obesity and diet-related diseases have been continuously important social issues 
in the United States. Nutrition labeling is one of the countermeasures of these problems. 
The primary goal of nutrition labeling initiative is to provide consumers with accurate 
nutritional information at the point of purchase and thus help them make a better and 
healthier choice in grocery stores. Several relevant sectors such as government agencies, 
non-profit organizations, food manufacturers, and retailers have made an effort to reduce 
consumers’ misleading of untruthful nutritional claims presented in food packages and 
design a credible and standardized nutrition label. As a part of this effort, in 1994, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) mandated food manufacturers to attach 
Nutrition Facts Panel (NFP) to the back or side of food packages under the Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act (NLEA). However, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) study shows that the use of NFP has declined over ten-year period and 
Americans’ dietary quality level still has to be improved even though consumers have 
accessed to standardized nutritional information of food products since 1994 (Todd and 
Variyam 2008; Guenther et al. 2007). Moreover, there have been a lot of skepticism in 
the academic literature on the effectiveness of NFP on consumers’ healthy food choice 




of information search costs (Kiesel et al. 2011; Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2013; Mojduszka 
et al. 1999; Mojduszka et al. 2001; Balasubramanian and Cole 2002).  
In recent years, front-of-package (FOP) nutrition labels have been widely used in 
the packaged food industry for the purpose of complementing the weak points of NFP. 
FOP nutrition label is considered as a supplement to NFP because its location and format 
are more convenient and easier to be recognized by consumers, which in turn aid them in 
making healthier food choices. Broadly, there are three types of FOP nutrition labeling 
system: nutrient-specific system, summary indicator system, and food group information 
system (Institute of Medicine 2010). Nutrient-specific FOP labels “display the amount 
per serving of selected nutrients from the Nutrition Facts Panel on the front of the food 
package or use symbols based on claim criteria.” Examples of nutrient-specific FOP 
label are General Mills’ Nutrition Highlights and Goodness Corner, Kellogg’s Nutrition 
at a Glance, and UK Traffic Light. Summary indicator FOP labels are in the form of “a 
single symbol, icon, or score providing summary information about the nutrient content 
of a product.” Examples of these include the NuVal system (that displays a food 
product’s nutritional score on a scale of 1 to 100), Choices Programme logo (that 
presents a “healthy choice” check mark on food products that meet certain criteria), 
Kraft’s Sensible Solution, PepsiCo’s Smart Spot, Smart Choices, Weight Watchers’ 
Points Plus, Hannaford’s Guiding Stars, Walmart’s Great for You, and American Heart 
Association’s Heart Check. Finally, food group information FOP labels “use symbols 




ingredient.” Examples include ConAgra Start Making Choices and Whole Grain 
Council’s Whole Grain Stamp. 
The benefits of using these FOP nutrition labels are under the spotlight because a 
FOP nutrition label is simpler, more visible and easier-to-read than NFP, as it is 
presented on the front of the package of food products. However, over the past few 
years, too many different types of FOP nutrition labels have been developed and 
introduced in the market, which in turn increased consumer confusion. In response to the 
concerns about this issue, in 2009, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs Margaret 
Hamburg declared that FOP nutrition labeling would be a top priority for the agency. 
And she encouraged food manufacturers, retailers and others in the food industry to 
design a standardized, science-based FOP nutrition labeling system that would be in 
compliance with FDA regulations in order to clean up inconsistencies among several 
different FOP labeling systems and hence help consumers make a better dietary decision.  
In 2010, with the initiative of the White House “Let’s Move!” campaign to reduce 
childhood obesity, the FDA undertook a more active role in creating a standardized FOP 
nutrition labeling system and requested cooperative effort between the agency and food 
industry. More specifically, the FDA announced a request for research on consumer 
perceptions on FOP labeling systems, tests of different types of possible FOP labels, and 
comments from the public about the effectiveness of FOP labeling systems (Food and 
Drug Administration 2010). In subsequent, Congress directed the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) to conduct a study with the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 




Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP) in the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) also supported the study that consists of two phase reports. In 2011, 
IOM released its Phase II report that recommended federal agencies develop a new FOP 
nutrition labeling system that allows only calories and three nutrients to limit such as 
saturated and trans fat, sodium and sugar. However, while the FDA was waiting for the 
IOM’s next report, two of the leading food industry trade organizations in the U.S.the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) and the Food Marketing Institute 
(FMI)opposed the IOM’s recommendation and announced their own voluntary FOP 
nutrition labeling scheme called “Facts Up Front” FOP labeling initiative. In contrast to 
the FOP nutrition labeling scheme suggested by IOM, Fact Up Front focuses on both 
nutrients to limit and nutrients to encourage such as vitamins and fiber. In the end, the 
FDA offered support in the voluntary Facts Up Front program (FoodNavigator-USA 
2012). As per the initiative, food manufacturers would present nutritional content of 
their products in an easy-to-read “call out” format which is based on the Guideline Daily 
Amounts (GDAs).  Food packages would carry four basic icons for calories (per 
serving), saturated fat (in grams and percent daily value, % DV), sodium (in milligrams 
and % DV) and sugar (in grams). The basic icons include the set of key nutrients that the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA)’s dietary guidance recommends consumers to limit consumption. In 
addition to these four basic icons, food manufacturers can include up to two icons for 
“nutrients to encourage” which include fiber, protein and a set of vitamins and minerals. 




can use just one icon to present calories (per serving) instead of providing all the four 
basic icons. In fact, Facts Up Front was not a completely brand new FOP label even 
though it was in the media spotlight in 2011 as it was launched to meet the need for a 
standardized FOP nutrition labeling system. In 2007, Kellogg and General Mills 
launched Nutrition at a Glance and Nutrition Highlights which were based on the 
European Guideline Daily Amounts (GDAs) system and very similar to Facts Up Front 
label, respectively. Given that nutrient specific FOP labels display quantitative and 
evaluative information on calories and levels of individual nutrients, for the purpose of 
my study, I work with nutrient specific FOP labels. Accordingly, I classify a brand as an 
adopter of FOP if it carries any form of a nutrient specific label on the front of its 
package.4 Figure 1 presents examples of FOP nutrition labels examined in this study. 
 








                                                 
4 Henceforth, I use the terms “brand” and “firm” interchangeably. For example, Kellogg’s Raisin Bran and Kellogg’s 





I briefly review the relevant literature in two research areas in which my study 
broadly makes a contribution. First, my study contributes to literature investing firms’ 
participation in voluntary socially responsible initiatives. Muller et al. (2011) and Toffel 
(2006) argue that voluntary participation in socially responsible initiatives is a signaling 
mechanism through which participating firms signal their superior management practices 
to their customers and suppliers. Set in the context of manufacturing firms’ adoption of 
ISO 14001, a voluntary environment friendly standard, Toffel (2006) finds that facilities 
with better ex ante environmental performance are more likely to adopt the standard. 
The author argues that it would be less costly for firms with superior management 
practices to adopt and be in compliance with the voluntary initiative. Levine and Toffel 
(2010) suggest that voluntary adoption of standards can lead to better outcomes due to 
organizational learning and restructuring of business practices. Building on similar 
arguments, I argue that firms that participate in the FOP initiative would invest in 
improving existing products, reposition existing brands, invest in research and 
development and introduce more new products with better nutrition. Thus, participating 
firms would become innovative so that they can further differentiate themselves in the 
market and make consumers pay attention to their efforts. Adopters of FOP are more 
likely to commit resources into benchmarking how their products compare with their 
competitors and are more likely to innovate to appeal to consumers who favor 
nutritionally better products. However, FOP labeling can be construed as a misleading 




(Draper et al. 2011; Nestle and Ludwig 2010). And therefore, understanding of the effect 
of FOP adoption on firm innovation is an empirical issue examined in this study.   
Second, I provide empirical evidence brining a new insight into how the 
implementation of FOP nutrition labeling affects food manufacturers’ new product 
development and reformulation of packaged food products. There have been several 
studies that examine consumer preferences for and understanding of different forms of 
FOP labels (Van Kleef et al. 2008; Malam et al. 2009; Lando and Labiner-Wolfe 2007; 
Feunekes et al. 2008; Gorton et al. 2009; Kelly et al. 2009; Dunbar 2010), relationship 
between FOP labels and food purchases (Vyth et al. 2010; Sacks et al. 2009), effect of 
FOP on food consumption (Steenhuis et al. 2010), consumer’s willingness to pay for 
FOP labeled products (Drichoutis et al. 2009; Balcombe et al. 2010), FOP characteristics 
increasing consumer attention (Bialkova and Van Trijp 2010), relationship between 
consumer demographics and awareness/use of FOP labels (Gorton et al. 2009; Vyth et 
al. 2009). All these studies have produced mixed results and focused on the demand side 
effect of FOP nutrition labeling. As the jury is still out on the impact of FOP labeling 
initiatives on consumer behavior, I turn my focus to the supply sidethe food 
manufacturersand examine if their participation in such voluntary programs leads 
them to produce more and better products for the consumersproducts with more 
beneficial nutrients and with lower level of nutrients that consumers generally seek to 
avoid or limit. Simply put, my study is concerned with the food manufacturers’ strategic 
reaction to their voluntary participation in product information (i.e., nutrient) disclosure 




products once they decide to participate. Research has not been nonexistent in the area 
focusing on the supply side effect of FOP. Young and Swinburn (2002) find that food 
manufacturers reformulated their products and reduced about 33 tonnes of salt in bread, 
breakfast cereal, and margarine categories within a year when the Pick the Tick 
programme of the National Heart Foundation was introduced in New Zealand. In 
addition, Vyth et al. (2010) conducts a larger study that investigates the effect of the 
Choices logo on food manufacturers’ development of heathier products in New Zealand. 
They conclude that the food manufacturers joining the new labeling programme are 
motivated to introduce new healthy products reformulate their existing products which 
are nutritionally improved. More specifically, after participating in the programme, they 
noticeably reduce sodium and increase dietary fiber in their products. Although these 
studies provide meaning insights into food manufacturers’ response towards FOP 
nutrition labeling initiatives, they are based on a model-free descriptive analyses that do 
not account for potential endogeneity issues that may produce biased results. As a result, 
their conclusions about the causal relationship between firms’ adoption of FOP nutrition 
labeling and their subsequent reformulation of food products could be questionable. In 
my empirical examination, it is important to discern the causal effect of FOP 
participation from the self-selection effect. In the following section, I discuss my 







CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
The main empirical challenge in this study is the endogeneity issue: more 
innovative firms are more likely to adopt the FOP nutrition labeling system and continue 
to innovate more. Hence, simply regressing the indicators of firm innovativeness on a 
binary variable indicating whether a firm adopted the FOP nutrition labeling would 
cause biased estimation results and wrong conclusions. To address the issue of 
endogeneity due to the self-selection in my context, following recent studies in 
marketing (e.g., Huang et al. 2012; Kumar et al. 2016), information systems (Rishika et 
al. 2013), and economics (e.g., O’Keefe 2004), I adopt a quasi-experimental approach 
with a combination of a difference-in-differences and propensity score matching. 
Specifically, I utilize a difference-in-differences (hereinafter “DID”) estimation on 
matched samples of treatment and comparison firms based on a propensity score 
matching (hereinafter “PSM”) method to quantify the effect of FOP nutrition labeling 
adoption on firms’ subsequent innovation. PSM helps mimic a randomized experimental 
study design (Rubin 2006) by pairing a treatment firm and a comparison firm that are as 
similar as possible on their observed characteristics. PSM avoids the strict assumptions 
that are often involved with instrumental variable approach.  
While PSM has been widely used in quasi-experimental studies to reduce the 




observed factors that affect both treatment assignment and outcome of interest, and thus 
any unobserved confounding factors may still exist even after conducting PSM. To 
further control for those unobserved factors, I employ a DID approach that differences 
out the effects of time-invariant unobserved confounding factors (i.e., fixed effects) and 
any time trends that could be confounded with the treatment effect. Briefly, the DID 
involves modeling the difference in outcomes (in my context, innovativeness) of food 
manufacturers during pre and post adoption of FOP between the two groups of firms, the 
treatment group (i.e., firms that adopted FOP) and the comparison group (i.e., firms that 
did not adopt FOP).5 For the sake of exposition, with respect to the treatment group, I 
refer to the time periods prior to and post adoption of FOP by a food manufacturer as 
pre-FOP and post-FOP respectively. The DID approach uses the comparison group’s 
innovativeness during the post-FOP period as the counterfactual for how the treatment 
group would have innovated if it had not adopted FOP.  
In this study, a combination of PSM and DID enables me to isolate the FOP 
adoption effect from both observed and unobserved confounding factors. However, if the 
unobserved factors are not stable over time, the problem can still not be resolved because 
PSM-DID does not control for time-variant unobserved confounding factors that may 
affect firms’ decision on the FOP adoption and their subsequent innovation 
simultaneously. Although I cannot fully account for the temporal unobserved factors, I 
                                                 
5 I use the term, comparison group, instead of control group because the former is generally used in a quasi-
experimental study design and the latter is used in a full randomized experimental study design. Although this rule is 
not hard-and-fast, I follow it to emphasize that there is a lack of full randomization in my study design (Remler and 




can test whether my results are robust to the presence of any “hidden bias” arising from 
those factors by conducting a sensitivity analysis. Both time variant and time invariant 
unobserved factors can be tested by using this approach. I will discuss more details about 
the sensitivity analysis in later section. In sum, my empirical strategy is rigorous and 
appropriate to address the endogeneity issues that are concerned in this study. 
 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE 
My primary data source is the Mintel Global New Products Database (GNPD), 
which reports all new beverages and food products introduced in global markets. A 
highlight of this database is that it provides detailed information on product attributes 
such as the brand type (private label vs. national brand), calorie and nutritional 
information, package claims and photographs of the front, side and the back of package 
for each product. Besides the product attributes, the database also has information on 
price, unit pack size and the number of units in a multi-pack product.  
For the purpose of this study, I focus on the following four food categories in the 
U.S. market: breakfast cold cereal, bread, sweet biscuit/cookie and potato snack. My 
decision to work with these four food categories is guided by the following reasons: 
First, all of the four categories are “fast moving” categoriesthe four categories feature 
in the list of 20 largest SymphonyIRI categories (Ma et al. 2013). Cold cereal and salty 
snack (which includes potato snacks) categories are among the top 5 categories ranked in 
terms of dollar spending per 1,000 households and percentage of households purchasing 




of nutrition have suggested that breakfast cold cereal and bread categories are relatively 
healthy and functional, and that sweet biscuit/cookie and potato snack categories are 
regarded as relatively unhealthy and hedonic (Ma et al. 2013; Moorman et al. 2012). 
This would enable me to examine if the effect of FOP varies systematically across these 
two types of important category classifications. Third, the key nutrients that food 
manufacturers may attempt to change after their adoption of FOP could exhibit 
substantial variation across these four food categories. For example, manufacturers of 
potato snacks may focus on lowering the sodium content of their products while 
manufacturers of breakfast cold cereal may focus on increasing the fiber content post-
FOP adoption. Finally, the number of brands and products is sufficiently large in the 
four product categories. To estimate the causal effect of FOP adoption, I use PSM that 
requires a large sample size for robust implementation (Heinrich et al. 2010). Hence, I 
use the four different categories for conducting my empirical examination.    
In going through the Mintel GNPD carefully, I identified that the first time a food 
manufacturer adopted FOP was on June 3, 2004 in the breakfast cold cereal category. 
Since I need sufficient data prior to the adoption of FOP, I started compiling the data on 
new products for more than a year prior to the date. The study time period is from 
January 2003 to May 2013. I spent over hundreds of hours putting together FOP 
adoption and detailed nutrition related information on all of the new brands and products 
(total of 686 brands and 7,593 products across the four categories) introduced during this 
long time period. Identification of whether a particular brand adopted FOP or not during 




brands form the crucial steps in my empirical analysis. Other than the key data source, 
the Mintel GNPD, I collected information on various brands and products from several 
sources (for the purpose of creating matching variables; I explain these sources in the 
following section). To assemble the estimation data from the original sample data, I 
removed treatment brands that introduced new products during either only pre-FOP 
period or only post-FOP period so as to circumvent the issue of survival bias. Given my 
interest in how extant brands responded to FOP adoption, I want to work with brands 
that were present in the market both prior to and post FOP adoption. I note that DID 
technique requires the treatment and the control groups to be present before and after an 
intervention. Applying the above filter enabled me to perform robust construction of 
similar groups of treatment and comparison brands (via PSM technique) and estimation 
of proposed econometric models via DID framework. I discuss these two steps in detail 
in the following sections. 
 
SELF-SELECTION BIAS AND PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
Prior literature advocates for the use of instrumental variables or matching 
techniques to correct for self-selection bias (Angrist and Krueger 1999). In my context, 
finding good instrumental variables that are correlated with firms’ decision to adopt FOP 
but are uncorrelated with firms’ innovativeness would be very difficult. Using weak 
instruments can only compound the problem (Bound et al. 1995). Another challenge is 
that even if I am able to find good instruments, given that a focal firm’s or brand’s 




identification (Wooldridge 2002) and/or inconsistent estimates (Angrist and Pischke 
2009). I thus follow recent studies in marketing (Bronnenberg et al. 2010; Huang et al. 
2012) that take the quasi-experimental study design approach to address the self-
selection issue. Specifically, I work with the PSM technique and transform my data to 
create matched sets of treatment and comparison brands; matching ensures that 
conditional on the brand specific observed characteristics that are used for matching 
(referred to as the matching or conditioning variables), a firm’s decision to adopt FOP 
(or not) is independent of the outcome variable (innovativeness in my context). 
PSM, a commonly used matching procedure (Rubin 2006), involves the 
calculation of propensity score which in my context, is the probability of a brand 
adopting FOP given a set of observables. Matching helps mimic a randomized 
experimental study design as when the propensity scores for two brands are identical, 
they are equally likely to be in the treatment group, i.e., adopt FOP (Huang et al. 2012). I 
estimate propensity scores by specifying a binary logit model of a brand’s adoption of 
FOP as a function of the following brand specific variables: whether the brand is a 
national brand or a private label, whether the firm is a publicly traded firm or not, 
whether the firm is a subsidiary or not,6 whether the brand is a member (or not) of GMA 
or FMI, the two leading food industry associations, and whether the firm is featured (or 
not) in the list of Food Processing’s Top 100 or Top 75 Retailers & Wholesalers ranking. 
I also include prior innovativeness of the brand (operationalized by the total number of 
                                                 





new products introduced by a focal brand in the 12 months prior to the adoption of FOP 
by the brand) and product line length of the brand (operationalized by the average 
number of variants of new products launched by a focal firm prior to the adoption of 
FOP). I note that I collected these variables from several sources. In Table 1, I present 
the description and the data sources of the variables used in the propensity score 
estimation. 
 
Table 1 Data Sources and Variable Descriptions used for Propensity Score Estimation 
Matching 
Variable 
Operationalization Data Source 
Subsidiary 
1 if a firm (i.e., brand) has a parent firm or a firm is 
subsidiary; 0 otherwise. A subsidiary is a company 
that is owned by another company (i.e., a parent 
company) that controls more than 50% of the 
subsidiary’s voting stock. 
Mintel GNPD, Wikipedia, 
Company website 
PublicFirm 1 if a firm is a publicly traded firm; 0 otherwise. 
COMPUSTAT, Wikipedia, 
Company website 
PrivateLabel 1 if a firm has a private label brand; 0 otherwise. 
Mintel GNPD, Wikipedia, 
Company website 
GMAFMI 
1 if a firm is a member of either GMA or FMI; 0 
otherwise. 
GMA and FMI membership 
directory 
Ranking 
1 if a firm is listed in Food Processing’s Top 100 





Total number of new products launched by a firm 




Average number of variants for new products 




I now provide a brief discussion on the selection of the variables used for 
matching. I use a focal brand’s prior innovativeness and product line length as proxies 




their products among consumers (Draganska and Jain 2006; Morgan and Rego 2009). 
The other brand/firm specific variables (national brand vs. private label, publicly traded 
vs. privately held firm, subsidiary or not, membership in and ranking by industry 
associations) capture other dimensions of the brand’s capabilities and resources and 
consequently a focal brand’s propensity to adopt innovative practices. Although national 
brands are more likely to participate in voluntary initiatives, retailers are more likely to 
adopt innovative strategies to remain competitive in non-price dimensions. Public firms 
are more likely than privately held firms to adopt FOP to signal their commitment 
towards socially responsible initiatives. With respect to the ownership structure of the 
firms, studies in the strategy area argue that firms that are subsidiaries (of large 
companies) have specialized organizational tacit knowledge. In my context, brands that 
are subsidiaries of other bigger firms are more likely to be focused on consumers’ 
nutrition related preferences and thus are more likely to adopt FOP. Industry associations 
collect information about changing preferences of the different stakeholders and member 
firms have easy access to this information. In my context, firms that are members of the 
two leading food industry associations, GMA and FMI, are more likely to be aware of 
consumers’ preferences for healthier food products and thus are more likely to adopt 
FOP. With respect to the two continuous variables, namely the number of new products 
and the product line length, I account for non-linear effects as well by using quadratic 
terms of the two variables. I note that all the matching variables are measured temporally 
before the treatment period to make sure that these variables themselves are not affected 




relevant variables are used for matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984). In Table 2, I 
present the parameter estimates of the binary logit model for PSM.   
 






























GMAFMI − − − − 
Ranking − − − − 






























N 121 186 298 81 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.4016 0.3311 0.2267 0.1999 
Notes. Only coefficient estimates of conditioning variables selected by a stepwise variable selection procedure are 
shown. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0. 01. 
 
For conducting PSM, I follow the steps expounded in Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008) that are implemented by recent studies in the marketing literature (e.g., Huang et 
al. 2012). I matched the treatment brands to the comparison brands with the closest 




matching algorithm. I choose to work with the algorithm as it allows for a more general 
type of matching with one treatment unit matched to one or more comparison units and 
vice-versa. It also allows for full matching without discarding any observations 
(Rosenbaum 2002; Hansen 2004). This is particularly important in my context as the 
number of treatment units is far less than that of the comparison units. After matching, I 
examined the performance of my matching procedure by checking if the matching 
variables are well balanced between the treatment and the comparison groups, wherein 
balance refers to the similarity of their covariate distributions. In Table 3, I present the 
standardized differences between the treatment and the comparison groups on the 
matching variables before and after matching and the percentage reduction in the 
standardized differences after PSM. As can be seen from Table 3, while most of the 
standardized difference measures are statistically significant prior to matching, the 
standardized difference measures are not significant after matching, which implies that 
PSM helps achieve covariate balance between the treatment and the comparison groups. 
Moreover, a series of the percentage of bias reduction further shows that PSM 
significantly reduces the imbalance between the treatment and comparison groups on 
their observed characteristics. The graphical representations of covariate balance (before 
and after matching are provided in Figure 2) suggest that the degree of covariate balance 
increases noticeably after PSM (the standardized differences of most matching variables 





Table 3 Covariate Balance Before and After Matching 
Matching Variable 









Breakfast Cold Cereal 
Subsidiary 0.8299*** 3.4173 0.1806 0.4847 78.23 
PublicFirm 0.9534*** 3.8661 0.1257 0.5071 86.82 
PrivateLabel 0.6609*** 2.7714 0.0746 0.3335 88.71 
GMAFMI 0.9273*** 3.7730 0.2247 1.0346 75.77 
Ranking 0.8671*** 3.5549 0.0806 0.3572 90.70 
NumProducts 0.7844*** 3.2467 0.4561 1.0846 41.85 
NumVariants 0.4726** 2.0136 0.0640 0.2272 86.46 
NumProducts2 0.6892*** 2.8819 0.5225 1.2450 24.19 
NumVariants2 0.1701 0.7358 -0.1642 -0.4865 3.47 
Bread 
Subsidiary 0.9539*** 4.9464 0.2786 1.1547 70.79 
PublicFirm 0.6622*** 3.5584 -0.0556 -0.2838 91.60 
PrivateLabel 0.7040*** 3.7657 -0.1710 -0.8321 75.71 
GMAFMI 0.9308*** 4.8420 0.2015 1.0000 78.35 
Ranking 0.7070*** 3.7804 0.0761 0.3870 89.24 
NumProducts 0.9000*** 4.7013 0.3450 1.3558 61.67 
NumVariants 0.5178*** 2.8202 -0.0152 -0.0689 97.06 
NumProducts2 0.9202*** 4.7940 0.5689* 1.9557 38.18 
NumVariants2 0.3809** 2.0951 0.0195 0.0686 94.88 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 
Subsidiary 1.1237*** 4.3599 0.1970 0.8044 82.47 
PublicFirm 0.8981*** 3.5255 -0.1889 -0.8298 78.97 
PrivateLabel 0.7311*** 2.8908 -0.0219 -0.1061 97.00 
GMAFMI 1.0665*** 4.1513 0.1161 0.4284 89.11 
Ranking 1.0928*** 4.2474 0.1193 0.3975 89.03 
NumProducts 1.3309*** 5.0987 0.2832 0.7229 78.72 
NumVariants 0.1777 0.7120 -0.0344 -0.1459 80.64 
NumProducts2 1.1921*** 4.6069 0.6316 0.9990 47.02 
NumVariants2 0.0842 0.3377 0.0448 0.2080 46.79 
Potato Snack 
Subsidiary 0.2117 0.6290 0.2663 0.6748 -25.79 
PublicFirm 0.2234 0.6639 -0.0208 -0.0486 90.69 
PrivateLabel 0.6909** 2.0061 0.0907 0.3392 86.87 
GMAFMI 0.5488 1.6083 0.2610 0.6738 52.44 
Ranking 0.3272 0.9690 -0.2354 -0.6203 28.06 
NumProducts 0.0585 0.1741 0.0083 0.0273 85.81 
NumVariants 0.3224 0.9550 -0.0821 -0.3575 74.53 
NumProducts2 -0.1206 -0.3589 -0.0492 -0.1825 59.20 
NumVariants2 0.0491 0.1464 -0.0326 -0.1496 33.60 
Notes. Please refer to Hansen and Bowers (2008) for full details about standardized difference and z-score 
calculation. 





Figure 2 Balance Assessment Plots 
                                (a) Breakfast Cold Cereal                              (b) Bread 
 
 
                                    (c) Sweet Biscuit/Cookie                                                             (d) Potato Snack 
 
Notes. Three types of dotted vertical line pairs are presented in the plot. Each type stands on a specific standardized 
difference value that serves as the decision criterion for achieving covariate balance after matching. I use 0.10 
(D’Agostino 1998), 0.25 (Ho et al. 2007) and 0.30 as decision criteria for covariate balance. A covariate balance is 
accepted when a standardized difference after matching lies between the two vertical lines for each type of criterion. 





In addition, I follow Hansen and Bowers (2008) and conduct an omnibus test for 
balance on all of the matching variables simultaneously (as opposed to comparing the 
treatment and the comparison groups on each matching variable separately). In Table 4, I 
present the results of the omnibus balance test for the four packaged food categories. 
Large p-values of combined baseline difference statistic (d2) after matching suggest that 
the null hypothesis of well-balanced matched sets cannot be rejected for all the four 
categories. All of these results taken together suggest that I am able to achieve statistical 
balance between the treatment and the comparison brands in the four packaged food 
categories that I study. 
 
Table 4 Omnibus Covariate Balance Test Results 
Category 









Breakfast Cold Cereal 35.0621 9 0.0001 14.6058 9 0.1023 
Bread 51.7639 9 0.0000 12.0008 9 0.2133 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 44.4427 9 0.0000 4.0933 9 0.9052 
Potato Snack 10.2956 9 0.3271 5.4291 9 0.7954 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the key assumption of the propensity score matching 
(PSM) is the ignorable treatment assignment assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
This assumption tells that conditional on a set of observed covariates which are not 
affected by treatment, the potential outcomes of both treated and non-treated units are 
independent of the assignment of treatment. This assumption is also known as selection 




units account for the selection process into treatment and control groups and thus the 
estimated treatment effect could be biased if there are unobserved (to researchers) 
factors that affect the treatment assignment and the outcomes of interest simultaneously. 
The bias due to the potential unobservables that are not controlled by PSM is called a 
hidden bias. Although the degree of hidden bias cannot be directly estimated, I can 
address this issue with a sensitivity analysis that tests how large the hidden bias should 
be to change the inferences on the treatment effect. If the magnitude of hidden bias that 
alters the qualitative conclusion of this study is large enough, then I can say that the 
inferences about the treatment effect are insensitive to the potential hidden bias arising 
from unobserved factors and thus PSM works effectively. However, if it is too small, I 
can conclude that PSM is not enough to account for the self-selection issue and thus it is 
hard to trust the conclusion of the quasi-experimental study using PSM. 
 Now, I illustrate the basic idea of the sensitivity analysis in my research context 
(Rosenbaum 1993; Guo and Fraser 2015). Suppose there are two firms, x and y, that 
share the same observed covariates, Z, but different probabilities of adopting the FOP 
nutrition labeling (i.e., px ≠ py). Then, PSM would match the two firms to create a 
matched pair because they are identical in terms of the observables, on the other hand, 
one of them adopts the FOP nutrition labeling and another does not. The odd of adopting 
the FOP label for the firm x is px/(1- px) and the odd of adopting the FOP label for the 
firm y is py/(1- py). And the odd ratio which compares the two odds is [px/(1- px)]/[ py/(1- 




Z, one of the firms is Γ ≥ 1 times more likely to adopt the FOP nutrition labeling than 












where Γ is a sensitivity parameter that is a measure of the degree of the insensitivity 
towards a hidden bias and thus the study becomes less sensitive to hidden bias as Γ 
increases. If Γ = 1 (i.e., px = py), the two matched firms, x and y, have the same chances 
of adopting the FOP nutrition labeling as in a controlled randomized experiment which 
is definitely free from hidden bias. However, this is almost impossible in the 
observational studies. If Γ = 2, the one of the two firms sharing the same Z is twice as 
likely to adopt the FOP nutrition labeling as the other. The sensitivity analysis tests a 
variety set of Γ values to see how the inference about the FOP effect may change. 
Therefore, the whole idea of conducting the sensitivity analysis is to check how much 
the study result is robust against any hidden biases caused by unobserved differences 
between treatment and comparison groups which cannot be controlled by PSM. If the 
result of my study is not sensitive to the hidden biases, I can admit the validity of PSM 
and thus I can say that PSM works well in resolving self-selection issues. In this study, I 
conduct the sensitivity analysis using Huber-Maritz M-statistics (Rosenbaum 2002; 
Rosenbaum 2007). It provides the upper bounds on the one-sided P-values testing the 
null hypothesis of no treatment effect along with the different levels of sensitivity 
parameter (Γ). Γ = 1 implies a randomized experiment with matched firms having equal 




which is slightly above the conventional 0.05 level is large enough to fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of no treatment effect if a bias of magnitude could be as large as that Γ. 
The larger the value of Γ corresponding p-value is slightly larger than 0.05, the less the 
sensitivity of treatment effect to unobserved biases. Please refer to Rosenbaum (2007) 
for full details about the sensitivity analysis using Huber-Maritz M-statistics. The 
sensitivity analysis in this study shows that hidden bias is not an overly concern, and the 
results of the PSM-DID in this study are robust against any unobserved time variant 
factors that could be possibly related to the self-selection issue. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
Quantity and Quality of Innovation 
I operationalize quantity of innovation by the rate of new product introductions 
of a particular brand. Table 5 presents the summary statistics of quantity of new products 
for the four food categories.  
 
Table 5 Summary Statistics of the Number of New Products - Quantity of Innovation 
Category Mean SD Min Max Total Obs. 
Breakfast Cold Cereal 12.60 37.26 1 320 1764 140 
Bread 4.74 6.38 1 43 1089 230 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 5.10 13.57 1 168 1671 328 
Potato Snack 5.01 11.15 1 72 391 78 
Notes. The unit of observation is at the brand level. Total indicates the total number of new product introductions 
across brands. Obs. refers to the total number of number of observations across pre- and post-FOP adoption (for 





With respect to the quality of innovation, I focus on the change in calories and 
levels of the following five nutrients: fat, sodium, sugar, fiber and protein. To compute 
these, serving size information is critical. However, the serving size information that is 
reported in the Nutrition Facts label is not standardized and manufacturers can adjust the 
serving sizes for marketing purposes (Mohr et al. 2012). The Mintel GNPD lends me a 
unique advantage as it provides standardized information (standardized to a 100g 
serving size) on each nutrient. In addition to individual nutrient level analysis, I also 
examine the effect of FOP on overall nutritional quality of food products. To compute 
this measure, based on a 2,000 calorie daily diet, I first transform the levels of fat, 
saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium and fiber into Percent Daily Value (%DV) developed 
by the FDA.7 I then compute the overall nutrition score by treating fat, saturated fat, 
cholesterol and sodium as “nutrients to limit” and fiber as “nutrient to encourage” as 
follows (Moorman et al. 2012):8    
.
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Table 6 presents the summary statistics of calories, the five focal nutrients and 
the overall nutrition score for the four packaged food categories.
                                                 
7 Based on a 2,000 calorie diet, Daily Values (DVs) for fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, sodium and fiber are 65g, 20g, 
300mg, 2,400mg and 25g, respectively. The Percent Daily Value (%DV) in one serving (e.g., standardized to a 100g 
serving size in this study) of food is calculated by dividing the amount of each nutrient by the maximum or minimum 
recommended Daily Value (DV) of intakes based on a 2,000 or 2,500 calorie daily diet, and then multiplying by 100. 
The DVs are listed in the footnote on the bottom of the Nutrition Facts label. For more information on the Nutrition 
Facts label, visit the following link: 
http://www.fda.gov/food/ingredientspackaginglabeling/labelingnutrition/ucm274593.htm. 
8 I note that Moorman et al. (2012) do not include saturated fat in their overall nutrition measure calculation. However, 




Table 6 Summary Statistics of Nutrient Content - Quality of Innovation 
Dependent Variable Mean SD Min Max Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Obs. 
Breakfast Cold Cereal 
Calorie (kcal/100g) 374.48 58.76 38.71 633.33 334.09 359.62 381.82 400.00 418.18 1160 
Fat (g/100g) 4.85 4.22 0.00 33.33 0.00 1.85 3.70 5.77 10.34 1172 
Sodium (mg/100g) 432.74 230.45 0.00 1185.19 63.40 254.90 466.67 600.00 703.70 1171 
Sugar (g/100g) 26.93 11.91 0.00 55.56 10.00 19.60 27.27 35.85 42.86 1170 
Fiber (g/100g) 7.55 6.56 0.00 86.21 3.03 3.33 6.67 10.00 13.33 1164 
Protein (g/100g) 7.86 5.22 0.35 61.29 3.33 5.66 7.14 9.38 10.91 1165 
OverallNutrition 80.19 5.94 56.69 113.39 73.52 76.67 79.50 82.85 87.66 1141 
Bread 
Calorie (kcal/100g) 276.68 65.59 10.00 504.00 211.64 238.10 264.55 299.91 357.14 803 
Fat (g/100g) 6.07 6.60 0.00 100.00 1.32 2.40 3.67 7.19 14.63 812 
Sodium (mg/100g) 498.27 196.82 0.00 1807.23 316.29 394.74 486.11 575.00 726.02 804 
Sugar (g/100g) 5.74 5.91 0.00 100.00 0.00 2.22 5.00 7.69 10.15 805 
Fiber (g/100g) 4.67 5.15 0.00 100.00 1.53 2.00 3.13 6.27 10.53 812 
Protein (g/100g) 9.08 2.55 0.00 21.05 6.49 7.50 8.89 10.53 11.80 806 
OverallNutrition 76.02 6.46 43.22 94.98 67.24 73.43 76.81 79.68 84.02 796 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 
Calorie (kcal/100g) 466.45 56.49 15.15 625.00 400.00 444.44 471.01 500.00 518.52 1261 
Fat (g/100g) 20.12 6.90 0.00 50.00 10.71 16.00 20.69 25.00 28.22 1260 
Sodium (mg/100g) 311.74 138.07 0.00 875.00 130.13 214.29 316.67 392.86 482.14 1206 
Sugar (g/100g) 33.65 9.46 0.00 75.00 22.00 28.00 34.21 39.47 44.83 1260 
Fiber (g/100g) 2.86 2.61 0.00 28.57 0.00 0.00 3.23 3.57 4.76 1237 
Protein (g/100g) 5.36 2.11 0.00 18.18 3.23 3.57 5.26 6.67 7.56 1238 
OverallNutrition 63.15 7.99 28.59 91.72 52.77 57.79 63.67 68.01 73.84 1183 
Potato Snack 
Calorie (kcal/100g) 513.32 44.89 388.01 584.00 451.01 493.83 529.10 535.71 564.37 247 
Fat (g/100g) 28.87 7.92 5.36 42.86 16.93 25.00 31.75 35.27 35.71 247 
Sodium (mg/100g) 659.08 248.92 3.01 1714.29 390.92 529.10 607.14 776.01 1028.04 247 
Sugar (g/100g) 2.87 2.50 0.00 14.11 0.00 0.00 3.53 3.57 7.05 248 
Fiber (g/100g) 3.99 1.86 0.00 14.29 3.53 3.53 3.57 3.57 7.05 249 
Protein (g/100g) 6.29 1.87 0.01 14.11 3.53 4.92 7.05 7.14 7.14 248 
OverallNutrition 63.76 6.62 41.22 83.37 56.81 59.57 63.24 67.22 71.80 247 




Effect of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation 
The unit of analysis of quantity of innovation is at the individual brand level. Let 
mbtL  denote the total number of new products introduced by brand b that belongs to a 
matched set m at time period t. Given that the realization of 
mbtL is non-negative and 
discrete, consistent with prior literature on rate of innovation (Hausman et al. 1984), I 
assume that 
mbtL  follows a Poisson distribution with parameter mbt  as follows:                           











   (3) 
where l = 0, 1, ... , and 0mbt  . In my context, the time window of measurement of new 
products varies across the brands depending on their time of adoption of FOP, and thus 
the count of new products is measured over different lengths of time. In such a scenario, 
it is recommended that the Poisson parameter be specified as a rate per time period 
(months, in my context) as follows (Agresti 2007): / ,mbt mbth where mbth  is the number of 
observed months for a brand b of a matched set m during time period t.  
Following a recent study (Anderson et al. 2010), I cast my Poisson regression 
model in the DID framework. Accordingly, for each matched set (denoted by m) of 
treatment and comparison brands (denoted by b), I model the logarithm of the expected 
rate of new product introductions as follows: 
0 1 2 3log( / ) ,mbt mbt mb mbt mb mbt mbt m mbth TB FOP TB FOP X                (4) 
where 
mbTB  is the treatment dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a brand b of a matched 




to 1 if time period t is the post-FOP period and 0 if time period t is the pre-FOP period 
for a brand b of a matched set m. 
mbtX  is a set of control variables for a brand b of a 
matched set m at time period t. I note that 
m  is a series of matched-set fixed effects that 
capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across matched sets.9 Lastly, 
mbt  
denotes the error term. My focal coefficient of interest is 
3 which captures the effect of 
FOP adoption on a firm’s rate of new product introductions. 
 
Effect of FOP on the Quality of Innovation 
Before I present the model for assessing the effect of FOP on the quality of 
innovation, I clarify two points. First, unlike the quantity of innovation model that is at 
the brand level, the analysis of quality of innovation is at the product level (I use the 
term “product” to differentiate between Kellogg’s brand’s Kellogg’s Crunchy Nut from 
Kellogg’s Raisin Bran). The reason is that these different products (brand extensions) of 
a brand can be very different nutritionally; since my goal is to examine the effect of FOP 
on the nutritional profile at the individual product level, averaging nutrition level across 
these products can mask the individual product level differences. Second, I note again 
that matching is done at the brand level and the analysis of quality of innovation is at the 
product level. This is because it is extremely difficult to find product-specific (that vary 
within a brand) matching variables. Moreover, the decision to adopt FOP is likely taken 
                                                 
9 Inclusion of matched-set fixed effects instead of brand fixed effects makes the model more parsimonious; this helps 
me to avoid an over-specified model and related problems arising due to small sample size. I also note that the core 




at the brand level. Given a brand’s decision to adopt FOP, the goal of this study is to 
examine whether a brand improves the quality of its products subsequent to FOP 
adoption. Accordingly, I employ the DID modeling framework to analyze the changes in 
the level of calories and nutrients for a product after FOP adoption. 
Let 
mt  be the first time of FOP adoption across any of products by a treatment 
brand that is included in the matched set m (I note that each matched set has only one 
treatment brand and that brands can adopt FOP at different points of time). For each 
matched set of treatment and comparison brands and their products I have: 
0 1 2 3 .mpbt mpb mpbt mpb mpbt mpbt m t mpbtNUTRIENT TB FOP TB FOP Z                 (5) 
In Equation (5), 
mpbtNUTRIENT  represents the level of calories and nutrients in a product 
p of a brand b of a matched set m at time t such that 
mpbtNUTRIENT   { ,mpbtCalorie  
,mpbtFat  ,mpbtSodium  ,mpbtSugar  ,mpbtFiber mpbtProtein }. mpbTB  is the treatment brand dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if a product p of a brand b of a matched set m is included in the 
treatment group and 0 otherwise. 
mpbtFOP  is the post-FOP dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if mt t  (i.e., the post-FOP period) and 0 if mt t  (i.e., the pre-FOP period) for a 
product p of a brand b of a matched set m. I note that both of these dummy variables are 
product-brand specific. 
mpbtZ  is a set of control variables for a product p of a brand b of a 
matched set m at time t. 
m  is a series of matched-set fixed effects that capture time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across matched sets. 
t  is a series of year fixed 
effects. 




nutrition level of the products. I compute 
mpbtOverallNutrition , the overall nutrition score 
of the focal product using the expression given in Equation (2) and use the following 
DID model: 
0 1 2 3 .mpbt mpb mpbt mpb mpbt mpbt m t mpbtOverallNutrition TB FOP TB FOP Z                 (6) 
The variables presented in Equation (6) are identical to the ones used in Equation (5). I 
transform my dependent variables (by taking log or by changing the scale) to make the 
distribution of the dependent variables as close to the normal distribution as possible (I 
refer the readers to Table A1 in Appendix for details on the transformations of the 
different dependent variables). As before, the primary coefficient of interest is 
3  that 
captures the effect of FOP adoption on the change in the level of calories, nutrients and 
overall nutrition score. 
 
Looking Beyond Average Effects: Quantile Difference-in-Differences Model 
DID modeling framework, although very useful in evaluating the treatment 
effect, helps explain only the average effect. In other words, it helps compare the 
treatment unit to the comparison unit pre- and post-treatment at the mean of the outcome 
distribution. However, it is possible that the treatment effect itself could vary across the 
different levels of the distribution of the outcome variable. For example, in my context, 
the effect of FOP on the change in sugar level may depend on the sugar level prior to 
FOP adoption. A simple DID model would ignore these potential differential effects. To 




studies (Abadie et al. 2002; Borah et al. 2011; Fan et al. 2012; Atella and Kopinska 
2012), I extend the DID model to a quantile difference-in-differences (QDID) model 
formulation. Other advantages of using QDID stem from the basics of a quantile 
regression model which does not require any parametric distributional assumption on the 
error term and allows me to detect changes in the shapes of the distributions of the 
outcome variable across the covariate variables (Koenker and Machado 1999). 
Furthermore, in general, a quantile regression model yields more robust and efficient 
estimates as compared to an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, which 
makes an inference on the conditional mean of the outcome variable. Finally, QDID is 
















CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
 
MODEL FREE EVIDENCE 
Before I present the formal econometric models in this study, I provide model 
free evidence of the impact of FOP on the quantity and the quality of new products. As 
can be seen from Table 7, FOP adopters, on average, introduced more new products after 
FOP adoption, when compared to the comparison brands. Whereas the mean number of 
new products introduced by the adopter brands increased by 20.00 (in breakfast cold 
cereal), 2.06 (in bread), 3.00 (in sweet biscuit/cookie) and 1.25 (in potato snack), the 
mean number of new products launched by non-adopters decreased by 5.49 (in breakfast 
cold cereal), 0.65 (in bread), 0.77 (in sweet biscuit/cookie) and 5.84 (in potato snack). 
 
Table 7 A Comparison of the Quantity of New Products in Pre- and Post-FOP Periods 
Category 
Treatment Brand Comparison Brand 
Pre-FOP Post-FOP Change Pre-FOP Post-FOP Change 












































Notes. The table presents the mean values of the number of new products introduced during pre- and post-FOP 
adoption periods for both treatment and comparison brands. Change is computed by subtracting the mean number of 







In terms of the quality of innovation, Table 8 suggests that the average overall 
nutrition score of adopter brands increased subsequent to adoption and that the average 
overall nutrition score of comparison brands decreased across all of the four food 
categories. Although these preliminary model free evidence results are aligned with the 
central proposition of my study, I note that these results present only overall trends 
before and after FOP nutrition labeling adoption and one has to be careful about 
interpretation of these results. In the subsequent analyses, I develop econometric models 
that capture the actual causal effect of FOP labeling on product innovation on the 
quantity and the quality dimensions. 
 
 
Table 8 A Comparison of Level of Calorie and Nutrient Content in Pre- and Post-FOP Periods 
Dependent 
Variable 
Treatment Brand Comparison Brand 
Pre-FOP Post-FOP Change Pre-FOP Post-FOP Change 











































































































































Table 8 Continued 
Dependent 
Variable 
Treatment Brand Comparison Brand 




















































































































































































Notes. The table presents the mean levels of calories, five nutrients and overall nutrition scores during pre- and post-FOP adoption 
periods for both treatment and comparison brands. Change is computed by subtracting the average values of calories, five nutrients 
and overall nutrition scores in pre-FOP period from the average values of calories, five nutrients and overall nutrition scores in 
post-FOP period. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
EFFECT OF FOP ON THE QUANTITY OF INNOVATION 
Table 9 presents the results of the DID model of quantity of new products 
(presented in Equation (4)) for the four categories. The DID estimates (
3 in Equation 




significant for three of the four categories, the three categories being breakfast cold 
cereal, bread and potato snack. These results are robust to the inclusion of several 
control variables such as price, unit pack size and number of units in a multipack. For all 
the four categories, the model that accounts for control variables fits better than the 
model without the control variables (based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)10). I 
find that the FOP adopters introduced about 388.42% (in breakfast cold cereal), 82.83% 
(in bread), and 64.31% (in potato snack) more new products per month in post-FOP 
adoption period than the comparison brands.11 I find that the effect of FOP on innovation 
is the greatest in the breakfast cold cereal category. I note that the standard errors that I 
report in the table are clustered at the matched set level and are heteroskedasticity robust. 
 
Table 9 Impact of FOP Nutrition Labeling Adoption on the Quantity of Innovation 
Variable 
Model 
(1) NC (2) YC 
Breakfast Cold Cereal 





























Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -502.61 -493.11 
AIC 1510.45 1497.44 
                                                 
10 I note that lower AIC indicates better model fit. 
11 This interpretation is based on the results of DID models with control variables. The percentage expression is given 




Table 9 Continued 
Variable 
Model 
(1) NC (2) YC 
Bread 





























Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -257.62 -251.90 
AIC 1266.93 1261.48 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 





























Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -549.57 -543.43 
AIC 2055.79 2049.51 
Potato Snack 




























Table 9 Continued 
Variable 
Model 







Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -145.28 -116.39 
AIC 536.72 484.96 
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of new products introduced by 
a brand. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) 
Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable of interest and its 
coefficient estimates that are statistically significant are highlighted in bold. 
AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
EFFECT OF FOP ON THE QUALITY OF INNOVATION 
Breakfast Cold Cereal Category 
I present the results of the DID and the QDID models of quality of new products 
for breakfast cold cereal category in Table 10. I find that the products of brands that adopt 
FOP have improved nutritional value along several dimensions as compared to products 
of brands that do not adopt FOP. More specifically, I find that on average, products of 
brands that adopt FOP have reduced number of calories, reduced sugar content and an 
improved overall nutrition score subsequent to FOP adoption when compared to products 
of brands that do not adopt FOP. I also find that FOP adoption does not lead to an 
improvement in product quality in terms of the mean levels of fat, sodium, fiber and 
protein. These results are robust to the addition of the control variables.12  
                                                 
12 Given the number of nutrients and categories that I work with, for the sake of brevity, I present only the estimates of 
the focal coefficients of interest (i.e., DID and QDID estimates) in Table 10. The extended version of Table 10 that 
reports the complete set of results of the DID and the QDID models (with the results on the control variables) are 




As mentioned earlier, analysis of the treatment effect at the mean level may be 
limiting and QDID estimates can shed more light on the heterogeneous effects. Indeed, 
QDID estimates suggest that the effect of FOP varies across the distribution of the levels 
of various nutrients. QDID estimates confirm that adoption of FOP leads to a reduction in 
the number of calories and the level of sugar content at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
quantiles, and increase in overall nutrition score across the four quantiles (25th, 50th, 75th 
and 90th). Even with respect to fat, sodium and fiber where I did not find a significant 
effect of treatment at the mean level, I find an effect of FOP across the different quantiles. 
In particular, I find that products of brands that adopt FOP have a reduced fat content at 
the top quantiles of 75th and 90th, lower sodium content at 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles, and 
higher fiber content at 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles as compared to the products of 
comparison brands.  
For a more detailed understanding of the heterogeneous effect of FOP adoption 
on the nutrition level of products in the breakfast cereal category, I provide the following 
numerical interpretation of the estimates of my models (that includes the set of control 
variables). Adoption of FOP decreases the calorie level by about 26.47kcal/100g, 
19.91kcal/100g, 18.34kcal/100g and 30.61kcal/100g at the 10th, 25th, 50th and 90th 
quantiles of the calorie distribution, respectively. Adopters of FOP also reduce fat 
content by approximately 31.50% and 29.90% at the 75th and 90th quantiles of the fat 
distribution, respectively. The QDID results show that adopters of FOP reduce sodium 
level by roughly 66.61mg/100g and 73.41mg/100g at the 50th and the 75th quantiles of 




FOP nutrition labeling adoption time period. FOP nutrition labeling reduces sugar level 
by about 6.92g/100g, 3.89g/100g, 4.39g/100g and 3.19g/100g at the 10th, 25th, 50th and 
90th quantiles of the sugar distribution, respectively. FOP nutrition labeling increases the 
fiber level by about 34.05%, 33.47% and 30.41% at the 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles of 
the fiber distribution, respectively. Finally, I can see that FOP nutrition labeling 
increases the overall nutrition score by about 1.79, 2.59, 3.67 and 4.69 points at the 25th, 
50th, 75th and 90th quantiles of the overall nutrition score distribution, respectively. 
Overall, the results suggest that products of brands that adopt FOP improve the 
overall nutritional quality of cold cereal products by decreasing the level of nutrients that 
consumers seek to avoid and increasing the level of fiber which is a nutrient to 
encourage. I note that since the QDID estimates help capture the heterogeneous 
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Notes. This table provides coefficient estimates of the focal two-way interaction term, TB × FOP. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     












I present the results of the DID and the QDID models of quality of new products 
for bread category in Table 11. Results of the DID model suggest that products of brands 
that adopt FOP in the bread category reduce the fat content and improve their overall 
nutrition score at the mean level. As before, results from the QDID model offer more 
nuanced insights. I find that when compared to products of brands that do not adopt 
FOP, products of brands that adopt FOP improve their nutritional quality by reducing 
calories, decreasing fat and sugar content, increasing their fiber and protein content and 
increasing the overall nutrition score (all these effects are at different quantiles). There is 
no effect of FOP adoption on change in sodium content at any of the five quantiles. To 
sum up, the DID and the QDID model based results suggest that FOP adoption improves 
the nutritional quality of bread products by decreasing the level of calories, fat, sugar, 
the nutrients that consumers seek to avoid, and increasing the level of fiber and protein, 
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Notes. This table provides coefficient estimates of the focal two-way interaction term, TB × FOP. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     









Sweet Biscuit/Cookie Category 
I present the results of the DID and the QDID models of quality of new products 
for sweet biscuit/cookie category in Table 12. FOP adoption does not lead to any 
significant changes in the nutrition content of sweet biscuit/cookie products at the mean 
level. However, the results from the QDID model suggest that brands that adopt FOP 
reduce calorie content (at the 75th and 90th quantiles), lower fat content (at the 75th and 
90th quantiles), lower sodium content (at the 10th and 25th quantiles) and enhance the 
overall nutrition score (at the 10th and 25th quantiles) of their products, as compared to 
brands that do not adopt FOP. An interesting finding from this category is that there is 
no effect of FOP adoption on the level of sugar, a key ingredient of this category. There 
is also no effect of FOP adoption on the fiber and the protein content of the products. I 
believe that these results attest to the nature of this category as this is a category in which 
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Notes. This table provides coefficient estimates of the focal two-way interaction term, TB × FOP. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     







Potato Snack Category 
I present the results of the DID and the QDID models of quality of new products 
for potato snack category in Table 13. The DID estimates suggest that products of brands 
that adopt FOP in the potato snack category reduce the level of calories, fat, and sodium 
and increase their overall nutritional score at the mean level. Results of the QDID model 
confirm these findings. I also find that such products also increase the fiber content in 
the 90th quantile. However, there is no effect of FOP adoption on the levels of sugar and 
protein. Interestingly, all DID and QDID estimates for overall nutrition score are 
statistically significant. Adopters of FOP increase the average overall nutrition score by 
about 5.97 points. The overall nutrition score of products of FOP adopters increases by 
about 5.29, 6.28, 3.33, 6.05 and 10.68 points at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantiles 
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Notes. This table provides coefficient estimates of the focal two-way interaction term, TB × FOP. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     






Summary of DID and QDID Results for the Quality of Innovation 
Given the large number of results associated with quality of innovation, I 
summarize the results in an easy-to-read format in Table 14. As can be seen from the 
table, the key takeaway is that brands that adopt FOP improve the overall nutrition score 
of their products across the four categories. Although there is significant variation in the 
effect of FOP across the four product categories, nutrients and quantiles, I consistently 
find that adopter of FOP reduces the level of calories, the nutrients that consumers seek 
to limit such as fat, sodium and sugar, enhance the overall nutrition score of products 
















Table 14 Summary of the Impact of FOP Nutrition Labeling Adoption on Quality of Innovation 
Dependent Variable 
Content level 
Mean Low Mid High 
Breakfast Cold Cereal 
Calorie ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ 
Fat − − − ▼ 
Sodium − − ▼ ▼ 
Sugar ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ 
Fiber − − ▲ ▲ 
Protein − − − − 
OverallNutrition ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 
Bread 
Calorie − − − ▼ 
Fat ▼ ▼ − − 
Sodium − − − − 
Sugar − − ▼ ▼ 
Fiber − − − ▲ 
Protein − − − ▲ 
OverallNutrition ▲ ▲ − ▲ 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 
Calorie − − − ▼ 
Fat − − − ▼ 
Sodium − ▼ − − 
Sugar − − − − 
Fiber − − − − 
Protein − − − − 
OverallNutrition − ▲ − − 
Potato Snack 
Calorie ▼ ▼ − − 
Fat ▼ ▼ − − 
Sodium ▼ ▼ ▼ ▼ 
Sugar − − − − 
Fiber − − − ▲ 
Protein − − − − 
OverallNutrition ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ 
Notes. The table presents the overall direction of the impact of FOP adoption on the mean, low, mid, and high levels of calories, the 
five nutrients and the overall nutrition score (based on the results in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13). The quantile ranges for low, mid, and 
high level are as follows: Low (Q10, Q25), Mid (Q50), High (Q75, Q90). ▲ and ▼ represent a positive and negative FOP effect on 




CHAPTER V  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In my analysis, I did not disentangle between new product introductions that were 
radical versus incremental innovations. In this section, I report supplemental analyses that 
take into account the degree of innovativeness of the new products. The Mintel GNPD 
classifies new product introductions into the following five types: New Product, New 
Variety/Range Extension, New Packaging, New Formulation and Relaunch (Mintel 
International Group Ltd. 2012). A product is classified as a new product when a totally 
new range or line or family of products is encountered. A product is classified as a new 
variety/range extension in cases of extensions to an existing range of products that are 
listed in the Mintel GNPD. The database classifies a product as a new packaging by a 
visual inspection of the product for changes and when terms like “New Look,” “New 
Packaging,” or “New Size” are written on the package of products. A product is classified 
as a new formulation when terms such as “New Formula,” “Even Better,” “Tastier,” “New 
and Improved,” or “Great New Taste” are indicated on the pack.13 A product is classified 
as a relaunch when a product has been both significantly repackaged and also reformulated 
based on a secondary source of information (e.g., trade shows, public relations, websites 
and press). These five types of new products vary in their degree of innovation (Fuller 
                                                 
13 I note that the Mintel GNPD does not look at the ingredient list to determine a new formulation. If a product is 
reformulated and repackaged, this is the default launch type to highlight the product’s new ingredient list (Mintel 




2004). Of these five different new product launch types, I focus on the three major types, 
namely new product, new variety/range extension and new packaging14 and examine the 
effect of FOP adoption (using DID model) on each of the three types. I report the results 
of my study in Tables A2, A3, A4 and A5 (see Appendix). I find that FOP adoption has a 
significant and positive effect on the mean rate of new product introductions across all of 
the three new product launch types in breakfast cold cereal and bread categories. In the 
potato snack category, FOP adoption leads to a higher rate of new product introductions 
for the new product launch type only. In the sweet biscuit/cookie category, I find that FOP 
leads to a reduced rate of new product introductions for only the new packaging launch 
type. Thus, I find that the effect of FOP is robust (in three of the four product categories) 
even after classifying the new product introductions into the three different launch types.  
A common limitation of Poisson model is that it does not account for the 
possibility of over dispersion that is common in count data. Therefore, I employ a quasi-
Poisson model (for the quantity of innovations) that helps account for overdispersion.15 I 
find that the core results are robust to this alternative model formulation. For the quality 
of innovation model, I note that the QDID modeling approach serves as a robustness 
check that I discussed in detail in the previous section. 
 
                                                 
14 The three launch types account for the majority of the new product introductions across the four categories that I 
analyze. More specifically, they account for 92.72%, 95.77%, 97.12% and 94.91% of the entire set of new products in 
the breakfast cold cereal, bread, sweet biscuit/cookie and potato snack categories, respectively. 
15 Negative binomial model and quasi-Poisson model are commonly used to account for overdispersion in count data. 
Among the two popular models, I choose quasi-Poisson model because it provides a better fit to the overall mean-to-





In the following, I discuss and examine how the effect of FOP on firm innovation 
would vary across the adopter firms depending on when they adopt and the effect of 
firms’ commitment towards producing better products. 
 
Quantity of Innovation: Early vs. Late Adopters of FOP Nutrition Labeling 
Organizational scholars have argued that the time that firms take to adopt 
standards is a signal of their resources and capabilities (Bansal and Hunter 2003). 
Whereas early adopters may be motivated by economic benefits and inherent high 
willingness to adopt, late adopters may adopt only to obtain legitimacy (Meyer et al. 
1981; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Zucker 1983). In my context, food manufacturers who 
adopt FOP earlier than later, may have the resources and a stronger commitment towards 
producing new and better products that may resonate with consumers’ preferences for 
nutritionally better products. Late adopters, on the other hand, may adopt FOP merely to 
follow suit without committing resources towards innovation. Based on these arguments, 
I argue that companies with greater (nutrition related) legitimacy may be more likely to 
adopt FOP earlier than those with lower legitimacy in order to signal their commitment 
towards producing better products. Hence, I expect that early adopters of FOP would 
develop and introduce more new products, and hence the effect of FOP adoption on 




 To test this argument, I classify the treatment group into early and late adopters 
of FOP by using the median time of adoption by all the treatment brands as the cutoff. I 
revise the model that I presented in Equation (4) as follows:  
In Equation (7), Early
mbTB  (
Late
mbTB ) is the dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a brand b of a 
matched set m is an early (late) adopter of FOP and 0 otherwise (the reference group is a 
set of comparison brands). 
mbtX  is a set of control variables that I used in Equation (4). 
m  is a set of matched-set fixed effects. mbt  is an error term for a brand b of a matched 
set m at time period t. 
mbtFOP  and mbtX  have the same interpretation as in Equation (4). 
The results (see Table 15) of my model suggest that only early FOP adopter brands 
introduce more new products when compared to the comparison brands. As can be seen 
from Table 15, this result holds for three of the four product categories (breakfast cold 
cereal, bread and potato snack) that I study. 
 
Table 15 Impact of FOP Nutrition Labeling Adoption on the Quantity of Innovation: Early 
Adopter vs. Late Adopter 
Variable 
Model 
(1) NC (2) YC 
Breakfast Cold Cereal 
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Table 15 Continued 
Variable 
Model 
(1) NC (2) YC 












Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -409.27 -382.74 
AIC 1327.77 1280.71 
Bread 









































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -253.72 -248.55 
AIC 1263.12 1258.79 
Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 








































Table 15 Continued 
Variable 
Model 







Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -544.55 -537.27 
AIC 2049.75 2041.17 
Potato Snack 









































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -144.74 -114.81 
AIC 539.65 485.79 
Notes. The dependent variable is the number of new products introduced by 
a brand. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) 
Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable of interest and its 
coefficient estimates that are statistically significant are highlighted in bold. 
AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
As a robustness check, I estimated a series of Poisson DID models to understand 
the effect of early versus late adopters on each of the three types of innovations 
described earlier (i.e., new product, new variety/range extension and new packaging). I 
present the results in Tables A6, A7, A8 and A9 (see Appendix). I find that early 





Quality of Innovation: Moderating Effect of Package Label Claims 
It is very common for food brands to use various types of claims on the front of 
packages. Broadly, there are two types of claims: a) nutrient content claims that “directly 
or by implication characterize the level of a nutrient in the food”16 and b) non-nutrient 
content claims that do not provide any specific information on nutrients. A key 
difference between the two is that nutrient content claims require approval by the FDA; 
only nutrient content claims that are specifically defined in the regulations by the FDA 
are allowed to be featured on food product packages. Also, the food products need to 
meet certain threshold levels of nutrients in order for brands to use nutrient content 
claims. For example, in order for a firm to use the “High in Fiber” claim on a product, 
the product should contain 20% or more of the DV for fiber content.17 From a signaling 
perspective, nutrient content claims serve as legitimate signals of brands’ commitment 
towards producing nutritionally better products. This would imply that brands that have 
nutrient content claims would have higher levels of technological know-how and 
structural capabilities already implemented to improve nutritional quality of products, as 
compared to brands who have no nutrient content claims or have non-nutrient content 
claims. Given that non-nutrient claims are not regulated, it is possible that brands may 
use such claims as merely a marketing gimmick and they may not have any bearing on 
the brands’ willingness to improve the nutritional quality. Thus, I propose that firms that 
adopt FOP (a voluntary measure) and have nutrient content claims (regulated by the 






FDA) would be well-positioned towards improving the nutritional quality of their 
products, as compared to brands who do not use nutrient content claims or have non-
nutrient content claims.  
The Mintel GNPD reports all the package claims that products carry.18 Nutrient 
content claims convey information on nutrition levels by emphasizing addition or 
increase in nutrients that consumers seek to consume more (e.g., High in Fiber) or 
addressing decrease in the levels of nutrients that consumers seek to consume less (e.g., 
Low in Saturated Fat). I refer to all non-nutrient content claims as other claims. To 
examine how the effect of FOP adoption on product quality is moderated by the 
presence of package label claims, I extend the DID model (see Equation (5)) as follows: 
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 (8) 
I extend the DID model of overall nutrition score (see Equation (6)) in a similar 
manner. In Equation (8), mpbtNutrientClaim  takes the value of 1 if a product p of a brand b 
of a matched set m at time t has a nutrient content claim and 0 otherwise. mpbtOtherClaim
takes the value of 1 if a product p of a brand b of a matched set m at time t has any type 
of claim other than a nutrient content claim and 0 otherwise. m  is a set of matched-set 
fixed effects and t  is a set of year fixed effects. mpbt  is the error term. All other 
                                                 




variables and subscripts in Equation (8) have the same interpretation as in Equation (5). 
The model presented in Equation (8) is an extension of the model that is presented in 
Equation (5) as it involves three way interactions. For example, 
mpb mpbt mpbtTB FOP NutrientClaim   is a three-way interaction between the dummies of the 
treatment group, FOP adoption and presence of nutrient content claims. Since the model 
helps examine the difference between the average change over time in the outcome 
variable for the treatment group and the average change over time in the outcome 
variable for the comparison group, taking into account the different levels/types of units, 
the model is commonly referred to as the difference-in-difference-in-differences 
(DIDID) model. The key coefficients of interest are 10 and 11. Consistent with the 
quantile regression approach that I presented earlier, I also estimate the quantile 
difference-in-difference-in-differences (QDIDID) models to investigate the 
heterogeneous moderating effect of having package label claims on the calorie and 
nutrient levels.  
In Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19, I only present the DIDID and QDIDID estimates for 
the four categories.19 The results indicate that the effect of FOP on the overall nutrition 
score is enhanced for products with nutrient content claims as compared to products 
without such claims in three product categories, breakfast cold cereal, bread and the 
potato snack category. Interestingly, I find that other claims (i.e., non-nutrient content 
                                                 
19 Given the number of nutrients and categories that I work with, for the sake of brevity, I present only the estimates of 
the focal coefficients of interest. The extended version of Table 16 that provides the complete set of results of the DIDID 




claims) have the opposite effect as that of the nutrient content claims. These results 
suggest that while nutrient content claims, which are regulated by FDA, serve as credible 
signals of a brand’s commitment towards innovation and highlight organizational 
capabilities, non-nutrient content claims could perhaps primarily be a marketing tactic to 
draw consumers’ attention towards the products. 
 







































































































































































































Notes. The table provides coefficient estimates of the focal three-way interaction terms, TB × FOP × NutrientClaim and TB × FOP 
× OtherClaim. The results presented in the table are based on the models that contain control variables. Robust standard errors that 
are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     











































































































































































































Notes. The table provides coefficient estimates of the focal three-way interaction terms, TB × FOP × NutrientClaim and TB × FOP × OtherClaim. The results presented 
in the table are based on the models that contain control variables. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically 
significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     













































































































































































































Notes. The table provides coefficient estimates of the focal three-way interaction terms, TB × FOP × NutrientClaim and TB × FOP × OtherClaim. The results presented 
in the table are based on the models that contain control variables. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically 
significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     














































































































































































































Notes. The table provides coefficient estimates of the focal three-way interaction terms, TB × FOP × NutrientClaim and TB × FOP × OtherClaim. The results presented 
in the table are based on the models that contain control variables. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. Statistically 
significant coefficient estimates are highlighted in bold.     








My study is the first to examine the consequences of food manufacturers’ 
participation in voluntary disclosure of nutritional information in the form of FOP 
nutrition labeling system. I analyzed 7,593 products and 686 brands across four different 
product categories (breakfast cold cereal, bread, sweet biscuit/cookie and potato snack) 
over a 10-year time period. I rely on a quasi-experimental study design that is based on a 
combination of PSM, DID and QDID analyses to overcome the problem of endogeneity 
due to self-selection. The results suggest that food manufacturers who adopt FOP 
produce more and nutritionally better products subsequent to participation, as compared 
to food manufacturers who do not participate in the program. I find that participation in 
FOP leads firms to produce more new products per month. In terms of changes in 
nutrition content, I find that firms that adopt FOP improve the overall nutritional profile 
of their products. More specifically, firms that adopt FOP lower the calorie content and 
increase (decrease) the level of nutrients that consumers seek to consume more (less). 
The magnitude of these changes varies across the product categories, the type of nutrient 
under focus, whether the firm is an early or late adopter of FOP and whether the focal 
firm has resources committed towards nutritionally better products or not. Based on the 
results, I offer the following theoretical and policy implications of firms’ participation in 





Participation in Voluntary Initiatives is not a Marketing Gimmick 
There is widespread skepticism among consumer groups and the policymakers 
that FOP labels are only a manufacturer tactic that may not lead to necessarily healthier 
products and can in fact confuse or mislead consumers (Glanz et al. 2012; Hawley et al. 
2013). Manufacturers may highlight only the beneficial nutrients of their products and 
not the nutrients that consumers seek to avoid consuming thus giving misleading 
information to the consumers. However, I find that there are significant benefits of 
participation in voluntary initiatives and that food manufacturers that adopt FOP produce 
more and nutritionally better products subsequent to their adoption of the voluntary 
nutrition labeling system. I believe that these results help strengthen the arguments in 
favor of introducing more voluntary programs for food manufacturers thus aiding in 
effective policy making. The findings of the study also contribute to the current literature 
on food and nutrition policies that aims to understand the impact of such policies on 
consumer behavior and firm (e.g., Kiesel et al. 2011; Moorman et al. 2012). 
 
Indirect Benefits of Participation in FOP Nutrition Labeling System 
This paper presents evidence that significant indirect benefits accrue for 
consumers from food manufacturers’ participation in FOP nutrition labeling system. 
Prior studies have established that NLEA, a mandatory initiative, is confusing and that 
consumers do not benefit from the information provided in the Nutrition Facts label. 




the FOP label, the results suggest that firms that adopt FOP produce nutritionally better 
products, and hence consumers are better off by consuming products that feature FOP 
nutrition labels. 
 
Signaling Mechanism behind Participation in Voluntary Initiatives 
The results that early adopters produce more new products than late adopters 
shed light on the signaling mechanism behind voluntary participation. Early adopters are 
more seriously committed towards the cause behind the voluntary initiative; unlike early 
adopters, late adopter firms do not innovate which implies that late adopter firms may 
simply participate to imitate the strategy of early adopters. The result that the effect of 
FOP is greater for products that carry nutrition content claims also conforms to the 
notion that firms that have already committed resources to producing better products 
actually innovate and introduce nutritionally better products subsequent to participation 
in FOP.  This suggests that nutrient content claims on food products, which are regulated 
by the FDA, serve as credible signals of firms’ commitment towards producing 
nutritionally better products. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
While my study is the first to assess the impact of voluntary FOP nutrition 
labeling programs on firm innovation and has important implications for both the 
policymakers and the firms, my study is based in only the context of the food industry 




industries. Future research could study other settings and contexts to evaluate the 
efficacy of firms’ participation in voluntary initiatives and help advance the 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the success or failure of such programs. In 
addition, while I argue that consumers reap indirect benefits from firms’ adoption of 
FOP, I do not explicitly examine the changes on the demand side during the post-FOP 
period. Future studies can help develop models that answer the question of whether 
adoption of FOP encourages consumers to make healthier choices. In spite of these 
limitations, I believe that my study sheds light on the importance of firms’ voluntary 
participation in initiatives that signal stewardship of corporate social responsibility. I 
hope that my study encourages researchers to examine the consequences of firms’ 
adoption of nutrition related policy changes as public policymakers continue to find 
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Table A1 Transformations on Dependent Variables for the Quality of Innovation Models  
Dependent Variable (Y)  
Breakfast  
Cold Cereal 
Bread Sweet Biscuit/Cookie Potato Snack 
Calorie (kcal/100g) Y / 100 Y / 100 Y / 100 Y / 100 
Fat (g/100g) loge(Y + 0.001) loge(Y + 0.001) Y Y 
Sodium (mg/100g) Y / 100 Y / 100 Y / 100 Y / 100 
Sugar (g/100g) Y loge(Y + 0.001) Y loge(Y + 0.001) 
Fiber (g/100g) loge(Y + 0.001) loge(Y + 0.001) loge(Y + 0.001) loge(Y + 0.001) 
Protein (g/100g) loge(Y + 0.001) Y Y Y 













Table A2 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type - Breakfast Cold Cereal 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (5) NC (6) YC (7) NC (8) YC 















































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -163.97 -160.05 -258.51 -257.35 -213.82 -202.54 
AIC 652.75 650.91 843.55 847.21 663.79 647.24 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 









Table A3 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type - Bread 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (5) NC (6) YC (7) NC (8) YC 















































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -173.15 -164.57 -184.97 -181.40 -125.80 -124.95 
AIC 736.66 725.49 916.35 915.20 539.34 543.63 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 










Table A4 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type - Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 















































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -299.47 -297.32 -400.29 -399.21 -257.87 -250.61 
AIC 1053.69 1055.39 1403.56 1407.39 894.38 885.87 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion.   










Table A5 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type - Potato Snack 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 















































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -64.12 -59.84 -87.28 -79.42 -73.03 -54.95 
AIC 227.91 225.36 356.67 346.93 258.58 228.43 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion.   










Table A6 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type: Early vs. Late Adopters - Breakfast Cold Cereal 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 











































































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -151.49 -147.93 -236.00 -229.10 -158.44 -130.02 
AIC 631.78 630.65 802.52 794.71 557.02 506.18 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 








Table A7 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type: Early vs. Late Adopters - Bread 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 











































































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -165.07 -158.21 -183.37 -179.37 -124.13 -123.23 
AIC 724.49 716.78 917.14 915.15 539.99 544.19 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 








Table A8 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type: Early vs. Late Adopters - Sweet Biscuit/Cookie 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 











































































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -297.98 -295.65 -397.29 -395.58 -256.36 -248.30 
AIC 1054.71 1056.06 1401.55 1404.14 895.38 885.26 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 








Table A9 Impact of FOP on the Quantity of Innovation by Launch Type: Early vs. Late Adopters - Potato Snack 
Variable 





(1) NC (2) YC (3) NC (4) YC (5) NC (6) YC 








































































































Matched-set fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -59.26 -54.55 -86.35 -78.17 -68.47 -48.39 
AIC 222.19 218.78 358.80 348.43 253.47 219.31 
Notes. “NC” and “YC” denote “No (without) Controls” and “Yes (with) Controls” respectively. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the matched-set level are in parentheses. The focal variable 
of interest and its coefficient estimate that is statistically significant is highlighted in bold. AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion. 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0. 01. 
 
 
